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1I. OBJECTIVES AND MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
Like companies in many other industrialized countries, most of the
evidence concerning Swedish industry indicates the 1970's were a decade of
poor profit performance. Many regard the mid-1960's as the starting point
of a downward trend. This has raised concern for the consequences of
the decline for industrial growth. The evidence suggests that decline
in profitability goes hand in hand with declining growth, the main trade-off
being changes in the equity-ratio (the ratio between owners' equity and
total assets). And a decreased equity-ratio might in itself serve as a
check to growth through its impact on financial risks (2). The need for
increased profitability has therefore become an often heard argument in the
economic and political debate. However, arguments have also been raised
that the long-run profitability has not decreased and that the performance
during the 1970's, viewed from a long-run perspective, should not neces-
sarily be of great concern.()
The purpose of this essay is to bring some clarity to the simple ques-
tion: how has Swedish industry fared up to the late 1970's? This question
can, however, lead to many different research designs. Ours centers around
the following two main aspects:
1. How does the performance from the mid-1970's compare with that of
earlier periods? If there has been a decline in profitability, is it from
an earlier stable level (in which case the decline might be alarming) or is
it from an extraordinary high level, returning the profitability back to
more 'normal" levels (in which case the decline may be not so alarming)?
2. Is the result conerning performance sensitive to our choice of
data, measures of performance and sample of companies? What are the most
2valid descriptions?
The second question respresents the type of question that usually gains
very little attention. It will, however, be given a dominant roll in this
report. For two reasons: first, the debate lacks precision and any effort
to structure the discussion seems worthwhile. Secondly, this utilizes a
comparative advantage the "Swedish case" has over many other countries.
Large efforts have thus been made during recent years to make data of high
quality available for research.
Questions are answered for two types of economic units, business groups
and corporations. A business group is a group of companies linked together
via ownership. Most often this takes the form of one parent company owning
one or more subsidiaries. The business group thus corresponds with the
'economic entity." We will concentrate on public business groups where the
parent company is listed on the Stockholm Exchange.
If the performance of Swedish industry is studied in terms of the per-
formance of business groups, "Swedish" is interpreted as "Swedish-owned."
Foreign subsidiaries will be included along with domestic corporations,
while foreign-owned companies in Sweden (i.e., subsidiaries to foreign parent
companies) are excluded.
The second type of unit we will study is Swedish corporations. Here,
"Swedish" is denoting legal corporations with residence in Sweden, despite
the fact that they might be a subsidiary to a foreign company. The emphasis
is on entities responsible for domestic production rather than entities with
domestic ownership.
Two main types of measures will be used, market rates of return and
accounting rates of return. The former are based on market data and de-
scribe rates of return earned by investors. They can thus only be con-
3structed for entities for which market data can be found, i.e. business
groups. The latter are based on accounting data of some form.
Two types of market rates of return will be used, return on total capi-
tal (debts and stocks) and return on stocks. Both measures will be expres-
sed in both nominal and real terms, the difference being the rate of infla-
tion (measured as the change in the Consumer Price Index - CPI). All market
measures are expressed before personal taxes.
Several types of accounting rates of return will be used. They include
rates of return on assets (all assets or only nonmonetary assets) and on
ownerst equity and they are expressed before as well as after company taxes.
All accounting rates of return are expressed in real terms except for some
measures for business groups based on historical costs, where also nominal
figures are given.
With two exceptions, all descriptions concern the aggregate figures
for business groups and corporations, respectively. (The exceptions are a
description of market rate of return on stock, which is partly based on
figures for the average firm, and a validity test comparing aggregate ac-
counting figures with figures for individual firms.)
The periods covered in the report are determined by the data available.
They will be:
Market Rates Accounting Rates
Entity of Return of Return
Business groups Stock: 1945-78 All measures:
Total capital: 1967-78 1967-78
Corporations -- Aggregate: 1951-78
Individual firms:
1966-78
Our main conclusions are the following:
41. By all standards, Swedish industry has fared poorly since the
mid-1960's. Decreasing profitability has been accompanied by decreasing
equity ratios. In the 1970's the decrease has also been coupled with an
increase in the rate of inflation.
2. However, the turning point as described by accounting rates of re-
turn came in the early 1960's rather than in the mid-1960's. The turning
point for the market rate of return on shares occurred even earlier - in
the middle of the 1950's.
3. The turning points marked an end of increasing profitability.
The decline since then is thus not a decline from stable levels but back
from a peak. Whether or not the decline is bigger than the previous increase
depends on the measures used. The overall conclusion as to the question
of a falling trend for the whole period covered thus becomes: not proven.
However, returning to old levels doesn't mean returning to old conditions.
The equity-ratio has been lowered and the evidence suggests increased finan-
cial risks. The paired reduction in profitability and reduced equity-ratio
should be of great concern. Moreover, the period studied ends with a drama-
tic decline in profitability, down to levels never previously experienced
during the period studied, i.e. since the early 1950's.
4. Accounting data based on historical costs for Swedish business
groups reveals declining profitability and decreasing equity-ratio from the
mid-1960's but the trends are not as dramatic as those observed from market
data.
5. The decline since the mid-1960's in the real rate of return for
Swedish corporations becomes more marked if we concentrate on larger corpor-
ations and thereby makes it possible to utilize data of highest available
quality. It also becomes more marked if we look at the median firm among
5these corporations instead of the aggregate. Further, behind the aggregate
there are substantial differences among companies.
II. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Before analyzing the empirical data, let's devote some attention to
the important question of how performance - more specifically rate of return
- of companies should be measured? Should we use market data or should we
compute rates of return from accounting figures?
The use of market data is appealing. It is in the marketplace that per-
formance ultimately should be assessed. The performance can be described
with regard to stocks, debts or total capital. If the concern is on the
overall performance, total capital should be the focus of analysis since we
don't want the measure to be influenced by changes in the capital structure.
In our analysis we will, however, also look at the performance of the stock.
To determine of market rates of return offers no big problems. The
profit component consists of two parts, namely the change in market value of
the company (the total value or the value of its stock or debt depending
on what we are to measure) plus distributed income (dividends and interest).
If performance is measured yearly, the profit component can conveniently be
expressed as a function of initial market value. In symbols, the market
rate of return for company i, period t, is then:
R. = ((M - M ) + D. + I )/M. , whereit it i,t-1 it i,t i,t-1'
R = Market rate of return on total capital
M = Market value on total capital
D = Dividends
I = Interest distributed to debtholders
If performance is measured over a longer period, for example, a business
6cycle, internal rates of return will be computed since the R ts are very
volatile when measured annually.
However, the obvious appeal of a measure of performance using market
data should be qualified. First, the measure of performance will focus on
earnings made by the investor and not on earnings made by the firm, the lat-
ter measure of performance being a way of describing the efficiency in which
management has utilized the resources they have headed. It can be argued
that in the long run these earnings should coincide, but in the short run
differences most likely occur due to all restrictions there are as to
changes in the firm's asset structure, etc. The impact of change in the
way stockholders are taxed for the benefits from their ownership can be used
as an example. In the short run it will affect market values but presumably
not company profits. Second, market data are available only for public bus-
iness groups. This restricts the number of companies and means a focus on
the performance of Swedish capital - which should be separated from the per-
formance of the domestic production apparatus. Third, even for public com-
panies, market data are easily obtainable only for their stock. Market
values for outstanding debt are not available except values on certain bonds.
(How this problem has been approached will be discussed in the next section.)
By introducing accounting rates of return, i.e., rates of return based
on accounting data (of some kind) instead of market data, some of the pro-
blems with the market rate of return are avoided. Accounting rates of re-
turn focus closer on outcomes over which management is supposed to have in-
fluence, and disregard some other factors that might be considered by the
market. And they can be computed for all types of companies - not only pub-
lic. They can also be computed for domestic companies, despite whoever
owns them, and thus can focus on the domestic production apparatus.
7Empirical measures of accounting rates of return have, however, re-
ceived a rather bad reputation for use in economic analysis. There are at
least three reasons for this. The first is the frequent lack of understand-
ing of how accounting rates of return should be constructed. Secondly, the
accounting rates of return are often based on historical costs which might
cause invalid descriptions. And thirdly, there are few examples of valid
descriptions of real rates of return based on accounting data.
We will try to bring some clarity to the construction of accounting
rates of return. As a basis for discussion, refer to Figure 1.1 The figure
describes the firm in terms of how the capital invested and the income earned
can be structured. It also gives examples on how different rates of return
can be constructed. The income concepts and the rates of return are in nom-
inal terms.
The first principle to keep in mind is that of matching income and cap-
ital concepts. If a rate of return on a certain capital is sought, an in-
come concept should be used that includes the income earned by that capital.
For example, suppose we are interested in the rate of return earned on
total capital. Then total capital should be measured as total assets (or
total equity) and income should be measured as operating income plus financial
income (for example, interest earned on monetary assets). Many macroeconomic
studies lack data on monetary assets and are thus formulating arguments for
using real capital (i.e., non-monetary assets) as the capital concept. In
tis case, the appropriate income concept to use is operating income. Often
this is calculated before holding gains and losses, because of lack of data
and the assumption that real holding gains and losses tend to even out over
the long run.
These are trivial matters. Still, confusion stemming from bad matching
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9of income and capital concepts is frequent. We will exemplify this later but
let's first consider the second principle concerning the selection of a
basis for capital valuation (and thus measurement of income). The principle
is straightforward: current costs should be used, not historical costs, if
valid descriptions of accounting rates of return are to be reached. The
arguments are well known and shall not be repeated here (cf. for example
(8)).
However, under some circumstances accounting rates of return based on
historical costs can be used as approximations for rates based on current
costs. What is the rationale behind this? How can this statement be com-
bined with the often heard argument that rates based on historical costs
will overstate "true" rates (i.e., rates based on current costs)? Here,
confusion with the matching of income with capital gives the key. The
argument refers to a rate of return based on capital valued at historical
prices as a measure of ROC, return on capital, where capital is interpreted
as real capital and income thus is defined as operating income. If income
is defined as operating income before holding gains/losses, the use of his-
torical cost will overstate the income (mainly due to depreciation on his-
torical cost) and understate capital. Both factors will work to overstate
the "true" rate of return. Thus, it is said, historical costs cannot be
used to approximate ROC.
However, the use of historical costs means that some of the holding
gains/losses are included in the income, namely those that are realized dur-
ing the period.2 The relevant comparison is thus operating income including
holding gains/losses. In times of rising prices, the "true" income (i.e.,
based on current costs) is typically understated if historical costs are
used since unrealized holding gains/losses are left out. Since the capital
10
is also understated, the errors partly offset each other. This means that
rate of return based on historical costs under certain circumstances might
be used as approximations to rates based on current costs. 3
Let there be no doubt, however, as to the preferences: current costs
should be used if possible. But let the merits of historical costs be val-
ued without confusion as to what kind of rate of return should be the basis
for comparison. This can also be stated with respect to the third important
criteria for the construction of rates of return: that of real vs. nominal
rates.
A nominal rate of return is constructed with no adjustments made for
changes in the general price level, i.e., inflation. The adjustments need-
ed to construct a real rate of return are effects of a changing price level
during the time capital is held. Whether we should call the ROC (based on
current costs) before holding gains/losses a real or nominal rate of return
becomes a matter of taste. It is nominal in the sense that no adjustments
are made for changes in the general price level. It is real in the sense
that nominal holding gains/losses are excluded. For the rates of return
derived from income concepts after operating income in Figure 1, the cor-
rect labeling becomes more easy: it is nominal if correction is not made
for changes in the general price level. 4If so done, it is a real rate of
return (10).
The distinction between real and nominal rates of return is, of course,
of greatest importance. As an illustration, let's return to the rate of
return based on historical costs and the question of its use for approximat-
ing ROC. As stated earlier, ROC commonly defined in macroeconomic studies
is based on operating income as an approximation for operating income includ-
ing real holding gains/losses. The assumption is that real holding gains/
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losses tend to offset each other and that a rate based on operating income
will thus describe the "true" real rate of return. The intention with ROC
is thus to measure a real rate of return. This can be compared with a com-
monly defined rate of return based on historical costs. It is usually con-
structed to show a nominal rate of return, i.e., no adjustments are made for
"inflation losses" due to holding assets in times of a changing price level.
Finally, one additional remark on the construction of rates of return
should be made. It concerns the treatment of taxes. Here, no obviously
superior alternatives exist. Throughout sections III and IV.2 of this re-
port, we have chosen to recognize only taxes actually paid and thus to con-
sider any deferred taxes as a part of income after taxes and thed accumula-
ted deferred taxes as a part of owner's equity. In Part IV.3, we will show
the effects of recognizing deferred taxes as expenses and accounting for the
accumulated deferred taxes as a liability.5
III. THE PERFORMANCE OF SWEDISH BUSINESS GROUPS
III.1 Market rates of return
Let's begin the empirical analysis by looking at market rates of re-
turn. We must then turn to entities that are valued at the market, i.e.,
business groups, and for which market values are observable, i.e., public
groups that are listed at the Stockholm Exchange.6 We will study all in-
dustries except banking. Altogether the least common denominator in
Part III is a sample of 45 business groups with a total of slightly
more than 600,000 employees out of which approximately 40 percent are em-
ployed abroad in foreign subsidiaries. The domestic employment amounts to
approximately 40 percent of industrial employment in Sweden. In some ana-
lyses we will expand the sample slightly.
12
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Let's start with the stock market performance. In Table 1 are mean
values for 5- and 10-year averages.7
Table 1. Average five- and ten-year rates of return
in public companies 1946-1978. Percent
Nominal Real
Period Return Return
1945-49 5.4 3.4
1950-54 18.8 12.9
1955-59 14.3 10.1
1960-64 7.8 4.3
1964-68 6.0 2.0
1969-73 8.5 2.0
1974-78 7.6 -2.5
1945-54 11.9 8.1
1955-64 11.1 7.2
1965-74 6.8 .8
1974-78 7.6 -2.5
earned by stockholders
If we concentrate on 10-year periods the rate of return was stable
during two decades to the mid-1960' and then fell sharply. Behind this pat-
tern, however, lies a more detailed pattern that is revealed if we look at
5-year averages. They indicate an increase at first and then a decrease,
starting as early as in the mid-1950's. The performance during the latest
decade was the poorest since World War II. In the last 5-year period the
real rate of return was even negative.
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Let's now turn to the most relevant market description on how the
business groups have fared, the return on both debt and stocks (total capi-
tal). Conventionally, this rate of return, R, is measured with the help of
market data for stocks and bonds, the latter being the measure of debt.
The rationale for the use of bond data is twofold. First, there are no other
observable market data. Secondly, debts other than bonds are assumed to be
of negligible importance.
For Swedish industry, however, debts other than bonds are the dominant
type of debt. To accept the bonds as the only measure of the value of debt
could seriously affect the validity of the description. The proper alterna-
tives are then to find a way to measure market values on all debts - although
no explicit values can be observed - or to drop the idea of measuring total
value.
We have chosen the first alternative, because of the availability of
the company data necessary. The tool is to find implicit market values on
debts from the market and accounting data that exist. This can be done if
certain assumptions are introduced. Generally speaking, the market value of
debt is defined as the present value of expected future payments where the
current market interest rate is used as the discount rate. The assumptions
and procedures used in the computations are discussed in the notes.8 Of
course alternative procedures are possible, but we believe any careful
estimates will show the same pattern across time. The data needed for the
computations, except the nominal market rate of interest, have been col-
lected from FINDATA, a computerized data bank with data on busines groups on
the Stockholm Exchange.9 It enables us to give descriptions for 1967-78.
They are shown in Table 2 where market rate of return for stocks is shown
along with market rate of return on total capital - stocks plus debts. We
14
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also give values for the equity-ratio to be discussed below.
Table 2. Market rate of return on stocks and total capital and equity ratio
for Swedish business groups. Aggregate figures. Percent.
Stocks Total Capital
Nominal Real Nominal Real Equity-Rati
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Average
Slope (in per-
centage points
per year)
7.2
41.5
8.6
-19.6
25.6
15.5
2.1
-. 2
32.6
.6
-15.7
16.1
9.5
3.8
39.7
5.0
-26.7
18.5
9.5
-5.6
-11.9
21.9
-9.2
-28.8
8.5
2.1
-1.06 -1.84
10.2
31.3
6.7
-8.4
10.9
15.1
11.5
4.4
8.7
8.5
-1.9
6.8
8.7
6.8
29.5
3.1
-15.5
3.8
9.1
3.8
-7.3
-2.0
-1.3
-15.0
-. 8
1.2
-. 92 -1.70
The downward sloping trend in real rate of return is clear for both
stocks and total capital. Using the periods from Table 1 it could also be
illustrated by five-year averages. For real rate of return on stocks it was
.1 and -3.9 for the periods 1969-73 and 1974-78 respectively.10 Correspond-
0
60.9
54.9
59.0
59.3
49.5
51.7
49.8
43.8
39.5
44.5
38.4
30.0
33.4
51.2
-. 49
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ing figures for rate of return on total capital was .9 and -5.3. The rate of
return was negative for all of the last five years.
Behind the similar development for stocks as compared to total capital
is a decline in real rate of return on debts similar to that for stocks.
For the period 1974-1978 it was -5.5 percent as an average compared to 2.6
percent during the period 1969-73. A main reason for this poor performance
for debts is the slow rate of adoption of nominal interest rates to in-
creased inflation.
Parallel to the decline in rates of return, there has been a decrease
in the equity-ratios (stocks as a percentage of total capital). The empiri-
cal evidence thus far on changes in equity-ratios have shown a decreasing
trend since the mid-1960's but has been based on accounting data (1, 3, 15;
see also later in this report). Table 2 shows a decline in the ratio also
when market values are used.
111.2 Accounting Rate of Return
The purpose of this section is to see whether the accounting informa-
tion published by business groups (i.e., their consolidated financial state-
ments) reveals the same picture of trends in performance as the market data
in the previous section. We will use accounting data as they are published
in annual reports and thus data based on historical costs. Any other kind
of data, i.e. based on current costs, are not available for other years than
the most recent ones. We will look at exactly the same sample of companies,
for the same period, 1967-78, and use the same set of data, i.e. FINDATA, as
in the analysis of market rate of return on total capital in the previous
part. We will make the analysis in both nominal and real terms - the dif-
ference being the rate of inflation. Also, we will only look at the aggre-
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gate.
Three measures are of concern:
RTt = Rate of return on total capital after taxes
REt,AT = Rate of return on owners equity 
after taxes
(E/T)t = Equity-Ratio
The second variable is supposed to be the accounting counterpart to the
market performance of stocks. It is defined as income after taxes, where
taxes are interpreted as excluding deferred taxes. The owners' equity
is measured in consequence with this (cf. Section II). In the income
calculation, depreciation over the economic life of assets is used rather
than depreciation charges allowed for tax purposes.
The rate of return on total capital is based on a capital concept that
is supposed to correspond to the concept used in the previous section. It
is defined as interest-bearing debt plus owners' equity.11 The income con-
cept i thus defined as income after taxes (as used in REATt) plus interest
12
expenses.
The nominal rates of return defined in the way discussed can be viewed
as approximations for nominal rates based on current costs. By deducting
the rate of inflation we are approximating real rates of return.13 We are
probably understating the current-cost-based real rate of return slightly. 14
The figures are shown in Table 3 along with figures for the equity
ratio.
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Table 3. Accounting rates of return after taxes and equity-ratio for the
aggregate. Percentage figures based on historical costs.
Rate of Return Rate of Return
on Owners' Equity on Total Capital
Nominal App. real Nominal App. real Equity-ratio
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Average
Slope (in
percentage
points per
year)
7.0
9.4
11.6
9.0
6.9
7.7
14.1
21.2
11.9
6.6
3.3
3.7
9.4
-. 20
3.6
7.6
8.0
1.9
-.2
1.7
6.4
9.5
1.2
-3.2
-9.8
-3.4
1.9
-. 98
7.3
8.8
10.2
9.2
7.8
8.0
12.3
17.2
11.2
8.6
7.0
7.4
9.6
.07
3.9
7.0
6.6
2.1
.7
2.0
4.6
5.5
1.2
-1.2
-6.1
-. 2
2.2
-. 71
73.8
70.7
69.8
69.8
68.0
64.9
63.5
63.6
65.1
62.9
60.0
56.4
54.8
64.9
-1.39
The accounting data based on historical costs reveals the same general
pattern as the market data, but in a less dramatic way. The pattern is:
decreasing real rates of return and decreasing equity-ratio.
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If we concentrate on the five-year periods used previously we can
observe a decline in average rate of return on total capital from 3.2 in
1969-73 to -.2 in 1974-78. Similar to the analysis of market data, the
reduction in real rate of return on owners' equity was more pronounced
than the decline in real interest rate; from 3.6 to -1.3 percent as com-
pared to 2.8 and 1.2 respectively for interest rates. The less dramatic
decrease in real interest rate is consistent with the inability in histor-
ical cost accounting to change the value of debt in response to changes
in the inflation rate and subsequent changes in the market interest rate.
This causes increasing overstatements of debts (compared to market values)
in times of increasing rate of inflation.15
From an accounting point of view this overstatement might not cause
any concern since it might be viewed as consistent with the principle of con-
servatism. More concern should perhaps expressed in noting that the
accounting value of owners' equity increased substantially during the period
measured as a ratio to the market value.16 In this respect we might add that
it is the big overvaluation (as compared to market value) of the owners'
equity that is the main reason for the much higher equity-ratios in Table 3
as compared to able 2. The changes over time in the ratio gives, however,
a similar pattern as in Table 2.
111.3 Final Remarks on the Performance of Business Groups
An important qualification to the interpretation of the declining rate
of return is raised by the question of how the cost of capital has changed
over time. Unfortunately, we don't have the necessary tools to make any
valid measures (see (12) for a discussion of methods). It seems, however,
highly unlikely that the cost of capital could have fallen the way the mar-
19
ket rate of return has. In the long run, real capital costs should be
formed on an international rather than national basis, given relatively un-
restricted flows of capital. The evidence suggests stable real costs of
capital in the U.S. and other industrialized countries. Even after consid-
ering the behavior of the institutional investors that form an important
party on the Swedish market (pension funds, etc.), it seems unlikely that
real costs of capital can have decreased the way the real market rate of
return has. Moreover, there is also a question of absolute standards.
Despite what the cost of capital happens to be in a certain period, negative
rates of return (cf. the period 1974-78) does not indicate desirable per-
formance of the Swedish industry from a welfare point of view.
Another important tool for analysis of performance is "Tobin's q", the
relation between market value of the equity (debts and stocks) and the re-
placement cost of the companies' assets. We don't have data for an
exact computation (since we lack measures of replacement costs) but we can
depict the probable pattern over time. It shows a slightly falling q, with
levels well below one the whole period 1966-78. 7 Of course, we should not
read too much into this because of problems in measuring the components.
But one of the implications should nevertheless be clear: it has been far
cheaper to acquire new capacity by buying other firms than by buying fresh
real assets.
IV. RATE OF RETURN FOR DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS
IV.1 Introduction
The previous part examined Swedish-owned business group. For them mar-
ket data are available and it was possible to compare their performance on
the market with their performance according to the accounting records.
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However, a study of Swedish-owned business groups does not tell us how
the Swedish domestic industry has performed. By domestic industry we mean
operations within the country. This is something else than operations run
by Swedish-owned companies. In the latter, operations in foreign subsidiar-
ies are included and operations by Swedish subsidiaries to foreign compan-
ies are excluded. The performance as described in Part III might actually
be the result of (or despite) the poor (good) performance in foreign sub-
sidiaries of Swedish companies and not due to their domestic performance.
The purpose of Part IV is to measure and discuss the domestic rate of
return. By focusing on domestic operations we abstract from the economic
entities that are valued on markets where we can observe their values.
There simply are no stock markets or other markets for external valuation
of domestic operations (except for those cases where the company is solely
operating domestically). By definition, if we want to study domestic opera-
tions, 'accounting rates of return are the only available measures of per-
formance. Further, these measures are available for legal entities (i.e.,
corporations) which will then constitute our sample basis.1 8
What are the uses of accounting information for units that by defini-
tion are not explicitly valued on any markets? We can see two main uses.
First, it seems probable that a market performance valuation - had it been
possible to do - would correspond to the accounting information in a similar
way as was concluded for business groups in the previous part. Second, and
more importantly, accounting rates of return give measures of performance
regarding activities over which domestic entities are supposed to have con-
trol, coupled with measures of equity ratios they give the basic pieces of
information from which corporate decisions on growth supposedly are formed
(2).
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The main questions to be raised in this part as follows:
- How has the long-run accounting rate of return in domestic Swedish
industry developed? And what are the subsequent changes in
equity ratios? These questions will be analyzed in Section
IV.2.
- How does the descriptions of rates of return and equity ratios
change if we
a) look at different kinds of rates of return?
b) use measures including instead of excluding holding
gains?
c) utilize data of highest available quality?
d) compute taxes including deferred taxes and change the
definition of liabilities and owners' equity
accordingly?
e) use different measures of total capital?
f) analyze individual firms instead of the aggregate?
These questions will be analyzed in Section IV.2 (questions (a) and (b)
and Section IV.3 (questions (c)-(f)). They are examples of questions that
should be asked in most descriptions but that seldom are, the reason being
lack of data. But in the Swedish case when looking at corporations the pos-
sibilities exist. The second question thus becomes a way of utilizing a
comparable advantage with the Swedish data - that of high quality and rich-
ness of details.
IV.2. The Long-run Rate of Return
Figure 2 gives before and after tax rates on return on capital, ROC, as
it is conventionally defined in macroeconomic studies, i.e., as operating
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profit - before and after deduction of taxes - as a percentage of depre-
ciable capital stock and inventories. No consideration is given to holding
gains/losses or financial income in the profit measure or to investment in
working capital or land in the capital measure. This will be done in the
next section. The data are primarily collected by the Swedish Statistical
Bureau (SCB).19 Although being of the kind of poor quality that usually
characterizes this type of data, it is still the longest backward covering
set of data that is available for Swedish industry.
The interpretation of Figure 2 is straightforward: ROC before tax,
ROCBT during the period 1951-78 had a downaward sloping trend of .09 per-
centage points per year. However, because of a falling tax rate (measured
as paid-in taxes as a percentage of operating income) over time, the ROC
after tax, ROC AT had a no-sloping trend. Both trendlines are, however,
not statistically significant. Behind the general pattern some details
should be observed. The 1950's showed increasing rates of return; .116
and .165 percentage points yearly for ROCBT and ROCAT respectively during
1951-60. The turning point to a decreasing trend occurred in the late
1950's or early 1960's.20 The rate of return was then almost stable until
the mid-1970's, i.e. -.025 percentage points per year for ROCBT and .030
for ROCAT during the period 1961-76. After 1976 the decline is dramatic -
with the after tax ROC down to .2 percent in 1978 - resulting in a decline
for the entire period 1961-78 of -.198 and -0.111 percentage points per year
for ROCBT and ROCAT respectively. This gives an ample background to the
economic problems Sweden presently is facing.
The decline in the tax rate (expressed as a percentage of operating
income) has ocurred despite an increase in the statutory tax rate. The
decline has several explanations, one of them possibly being the introduc-
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tion of several possibilities for companies to defer taxes, for example
through formation of investment funds from the late 1950's. Another main
reason is the decrease in the equity-ratio and the corresponding increase
in interest expenses which have reduced the portion of the before-tax ROC
chargeable to income taxes. The equity-ratio is shown below in Table 4.
Alternative measures
The main pattern does not change if the measure of profitability is de-
fined as including holding gains or if it is based on a slightly changed in-
come and capital concepts. This can be found by studying Figures 3 and 4,
where ROC, including holding gains/losses and R rate of return on total
capital are described.21 By holding gain/loss we mean the change in re-
placement costs of the nonmonetary assets (due to changes in specific
prices) over the inflation rate, measured as the change in CPI - Consumer
Price Index. By RT we mean return on total capital, i.e. non-monetary and
monetary assets together.22 The inclusion of monetary capital in the denom-
inator makes it necessary to add the accompanying income concept - i.e.
mainly interests received - to the income concept used in ROC (i.e., operat-
ing income). The added income component must be expressed net of holding
losses on monetary assets due to inflation, i.e. expressed in real terms
(cf. Part II). The alternative measures are based on the same data set as
used above.
Let's first consider ROC, including holding gains/losses (Figure 3).
The decline in a trendline applied to the data is very similar to that for
ROC (Figure 2). For the whole period 1954-78 it is -.075 and -.020 percent-
age points per year for the before and after-tax measure compared to -.144
and -.023 percentage points respectively for ROCBT and ROC AT Also the
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FIGURE 4: Real Rate of Return on Total Capital, 1954-1978
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levels of rates of return are similar. The main impact of including real
holding gains/losses is that the outcome fluctuates slightly more around
the trend line. The methodological conclusion from the comparison between
ROC and ROC including holding gains/losses, then becomes, that we could
stay with the traditional measure, i.e. ROC, and not bother about holding
gain/losses, as long as we are interested in the long-run performance. For
short-run descriptions it becomes important to consider the holding gains/
losses.
Let's now turn to R the most relevant measure of performance of total
capital (cf. Figure 4). Once again, the description of trends becomes sim-
ilar to those for ROC. For the whole period 1954-78 the trendline declines:
-.219 and -.096 percentage points per year for the before and after-tax mea-
sure respectively (compared to -. 144 and -.023 percentage points for ROCBT
and ROC AT respectively). Compared to ROC including holding gains/losses
the yearly fluctuations are smaller - about the same as for ROC.
The methodological conclusion then becomes, that if "performance" is
interpreted as ROC, the resulting trend line is slightly less downward
sloping than the trendline for the most relevant measure of overall per-
formance, that based on total capital. But this is not the whole methodo-
logical picture. In terms of level of rate of return, the RT is generally
lower than ROC. The average level for the whole period 1954-78 is 2.9 and
1.7 percentage points for RT before and after tax, respectively, compared to
6.1 and 4.4 for ROC. The reason behind this difference is mainly that the
real rate of return on monetary capital has been very low. As a matter of
fact it has probably been negative during the 1970's. 2 3
The numbers behind Figures 2, 3 and 4 are shown below in Table 4.
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Income Sharing
Let's conclude the analysis of the long-term performance of Swedish
corporations by adding a description of how income has been shared - speci-
fically the real rate of return on owner's equity after tax, REAT* By so
doing we will give the accounting counterpart to the long-term market rate
of return on shares described in Part 111.2 (although concerning a different
business entity - the corporation rather than the business group).
RE,AT is depicted in Figure 5 together with RTAT (which was also
shown in Figure 4). The general pattern for REAT is similar to that of
RT,AT' meaning an increased rate of return during the 1950's (slope =
.489 percentage points per year 1954-60) and a declining rate of return
since then (slope = -0.070 percentage points per year 1961-78). For the
whole period 1954-78, however, the trendline is slightly upward sloping
(.026 percentage points per year). We will return to this measure for the
entire -period, but let's first observe some details. First, the trend
during the period 1967-78 (the period used in Part III for descriptions of
accounting rates of return and market rates of return on stock and total
capital) declined less steeply for REAT than for RTAT' i.e. with -.129
percentage points per year compared to -.464. This implies that the real
rate of return on debts has fallen even more. The owners of equity have
partly been compensated for the decline in real RT by a bigger decline in
real interest rates. This is the opposite picture than the one given for
business groups using accounting data (Section 111.3) where RE,AT fell more
sharply than R TAT. The reason behind this different picture is, however,
probably "technical" in the sense that Part 111.3 was based on net assets
(excluding non-interest bearing liabilities) whilst total capital - and
liabilities - are measured gross in this part.
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Secondly, the turning point for REAT occurred in the late 1950's or
early 1960's while it occurred a few years earlier when using market data
(cf. Table 1).
Thirdly, the spectacular increase in R AT in 1974 deserves some com-
ments. Behind this is a structural change combined with a temporar. The
temporar change has to do with changes in the tax system that were made
specifically for 1974.24 This helped cause an extraordinary REAT, since
we define taxes as taxes payable. The structural change has to do with
changes in the equity-ratio. It decreased from 67 percent in 1954 to 53 per-
cent in 1978 (cf. Table 4, below). Implied in this decrease is higher
fluctuations in RE,AT' following given fluctuations in RT,AT'
When having introduced the equity-ratio in the discussion, let's re-
turn to the general pattern for the entire perod 1954-78 and some addition-
al comments regarding the relationship between REAT and the equity ratio.
One way of understanding the almost stable RE,AT (trendline = .026 percent-
age points per year) as compared to a declining RTAT (slope = -.096) is to
refer to changes in the equity-ratio combined with low or at times negative
real rates of return on debts. In other words, a decreasing RTAT has been
"compensated" by an increased leverage. However, the implicit increase in
financial risk does not correspond with an increased REAT - the rate of
return has only been held nearly constant.
The relation between a changed equity-ratio and changes in rates of
return should be given an additional comment. It has to do with the implied
growth rates. The decrease in equity-ratio was concentrated on the period
prior to the 1970's. Thus, it decreased from 67 percent in 1954 to 54 per-
cent in 1969 and was thereafter almost constant, ending at 53 percent in
1978 (cf. however the validity tests in the next section). At the same
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time we can observe both RTAT and REAT falling more sharply in the 1970's
than earlier after the turning point in the late 1950's. How come?
Shouldn't falling profitability correspond to decreased equity-ratio? The
answer lies with the real rate of growth in capital. Prior to the 1970's
the rate of growth was high enough to result in decreasing equity-ratio
despite a comparatively high real rate of return. In the 1970's the growth
rate declined to levels where even a decreasing REAT couldn't make the
equity-ratio fall further.
This is an "economic" explanation behind the changes in the equity-
ratio. It should, however, be kept in mind that the analyses in this part
is based on data of relatively poor quality. The impact of a switch to
data of higher quality will be shown next.
The values for the equity-ratio together with numbers for the variables
previously discussed in Part IV.2 are summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4
Accounting Rates of Return and Equity Ratio
in Swedish Corporations 1951-78
Aggregate Figures. Percent.
ROC ROC
incl. real HG/L
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
BTBT
6.8
5.0
6.2
6.6
6.6
6.0
6.5
7.4
8.3.
7.7
7.4
5.8
6.1
7.2.
7.3.
6.1
5.6
5.9
7.2
5.9
4.5
AT
3.2
2.9
3.5
3.7
3.5
3.4
3.8
5.1
6.0
5.6
5.2
4.0
4.2
5.2
5.4
4.4
4.0
4.0
5.5
4.6
3.6
a.a
n. a
n. a
5.7
5.8
8.8
5.0
5.2
7.4
9.4
7.8
7.6
4.7
7.6
6.7
4.8
7.1
5.5
2.7
6.2
3.9
RT
AT
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
2.8
2.7
6.2
2.2
2.9
5.1
7.2
5.6
5.8
2.7
5.6
4.5
3.1
5.5
3.7
1.0
4.9
3.0
Real
BT
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
4.4
1.3
4.6
2.7
3.4
5.8
5.4
5.3
4.5
3.3
4.9
3.0
3.4
5.3
4.8
1.2
2.0
.1
AT
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
2.5
-. 8
2.9
.8
1.9
4.3
4.0
3.9
3.2
2.0
3.5
1.7
2.4
4.3
3.8
.1
1.1
-.5
Real
REAT
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2.7
.6
5.3
1.5
2.6
5.3
6.7
5.7
5.6
2.7
5.5
4.3
2.9
5.8
4.4
.6
4.6
1.9
Equity
Ratio
63
65
66
67
65
65
65
66
65
63
63
64
64
63
60
58
59
58
54
52
54
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
5.2
7.7
9.6
5.8
4.2
1.4
.9
Averages:
1954-58 6.6
1959-63 7.1
1964-68 6.4
1969-73 6.1
1974-78 4.4
1954-78 6.1
b pe
1951-78
1954-78
1951-60
1954-60
1961-78
rcentage
-.090
-.144
.116
.289
-.198
4.0
6.5
8.7
4.7
3.3
.8
.2
3.9
5.0
4.6
4.8
3.5
4.4
points
.001
-. 023
.165
.443
-.111
5.3
8.3
13.5
7.3
5.4
.0
2.9
6.1
7.4
6.4
5.3
5.8
6.2
per year
n.a.
-.075
n.a.
.382
-.120
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4.1
7.1
12.6
6.2
4.5
-.7
2.2
3.4
5.3
4.5
4.0
5.0
4.4
2.2
3.4
5.4
1.4
.7
-5.0
-1.2
1.4
2.6
4.8
.8
-.1
-5.4
-1.6
n. a
-. 020
n.a
.525
-. 033
4.1
7.4
13.2
5.5
3.4
-3.1
3.0
3.3
4.9
4.3
1.8
.3
2.9
n.a
-. 219
n.a
.386
-. 343
54
54
56
54
56
53
53
1.5
3.5
3.1
1.0
-. 3
1.7
n.a
-.096
n. a
.489
-. 285
2.5
5.2
4.6
3.7
4.4
65
64
60
54
54
4.1 60
n.a
.026
n.a
.668
-. 070
-. 056
-.064
-.004
-. 039
-.066
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IV.3.. Tests of validity.
The last section of the report will be devoted entirely to discussing
the validity of the descriptions made in the previous section. We will
thereby utilize data of highest quality available. The data set - called
"the KKR-bank" - has been established by the Economic Research Institute
at the Stockholm School of Economics (EFI) and concern all Swedish corpora-
tions with more than 200 employees, i.e., approximately 400 corporations.
Together, these companies see almost 70 percent of domestic industrial
employment.
The main differences compared to the data used in the previous section
are the following:
a) The object of study is the individual corporation rather than the
aggregate.
b) The data are arranged so as to guarantee a consistent measurement
of each year and every company over time. This includes data of
equal quality for all companies and all years. It means that
"technical" problems, for example mergers, are analyzed and treat-
ed in a consistent manner.
c) For each corporation, individually assigned depreciation rates
are used.
d) Current costs are used as the valuation basis.
e) In the income measurement, all holding gains or losses are iso-
lated from the operating income. Among other things, this de-
mands not only for current cost data regarding total inventories,
but also on the different kinds of inventorie, i.e. supplies,
work-in-progress and finished goods.
f) Land is included among the assets. No real holding gains/losses
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are recognized on land.
One way of giving an overall picture of the quality and the details in
"the KKR-bank" is to mention that for all companies and all years, it in-
cludes the same kind of details on current costs, etc., that are required
to be diclosed in annual reports by larger U.S. corporations from 1980
according to FASB 33 (8).
The high standards formulated for the data have made it impossible to
expand to period of study further back than to 1966. At the same time, the
work needed to update the data set is substantial. This has forced us to
end the period of analysis in 1976. This means, however, that we will
cover the main part of the period characterized by decreasing rates of re-
turn. But the two "extreme" years of 1977 and 1978 will be left outside
the analyses.
We will concentrate on three variables, RT,BT, RE,AT and the equity-
ratio.' RT is selected to represent the ultimate choice of variables used
for describing overall - independent of the capital structure - performance.
It is measured before tax to achieve correspondences with what is customar-
ily done. By including REAT we will indicate how the income has been
shared. In this case the most relevant measure is after tax. And finally,
the equity-ratio is included in order to indicate the changes in capital
structure accompanying the trends in profitability.
Our validity analysis will cover two main dimensions (corresponding
to questions c-f, on page 20). The first regards the impact on the descrip-
tion of different data sets and different ways of operationalizing variables.
The second regards differences between descriptions for the aggregate and
for individual firms.
Table 5 summarizes the first dimension. Along with the data and
Table 5
Impact on Measures of
Definitions Used.
Substituting the Data Set and/or
Aggregate Numbers. Percent.
a)
Year Previously
Described
1966
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
3.4
5.3
4.8
1.2
2.0
.1
2.2
3.4
5.4
1.4
.7
Real R'T, BT
b)
Capital
Excluding
Current
Liabilities
6.3
6.2
6.1
7.8
3.1
3.9
5.4
8.6
8.8
3.8
2.1
c)
Deferred
Taxes =
Liability
3.6
4.1
4.2
5.0
.1
1.4
2.6
4.6
4.0
.4
-. 8
d)
Previously
Described
2.9
5.8
4.4
.6
4.6
1.9
4.1
7.4
13.2
5.5
3.4
Real REAT
e)
Capital
Excluding
Current
Liabilities
3.3
2.9
1.9
4.3
-. 6
.4
3.0
9.0
9.0
1.5
-. 9
f)
Deferred
Taxes =
Liability
3.6
3.5
3.3
4.5
- 1.2
.3
2.4
6.4
5.4
.6
- .2
g)
Previously
Described
58
59
58
54
52
54
54
54
56
54
56
Equity Ratio
h)
Capital
Excluding
Current
Liabilities
76
75
73
72
71
68
66
65
66
66
64
i)
Deferred
Taxes =
Liability
43
43
42
42
40
37
36
36
34
33
32
Average 2.7
Slope (in
percentage
points
per Y) -. 21
It
5.6
-. 17
2.7
-. 32
4.9
.37
3.0
.07
2.6
-. 15
55
-. 31
69
-1.24
40
-1.22
O-N
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measures used in Section IV.2, two alternative measures are given. Both
are based on the "KKR-bank." In the first alternative, capital is
measured excluding current liabilities (i.e., monetary assets have been
defined net of current liabilities; this was not done in Section IV.2).
In the second alternative, deferred taxes are recognized as liabilities
and tax expenses are defined including the taxes deferred each period. In
this case, however, no component has been excluded from the capital.
The first alternative has no implication for R EAT, since owners'
equity doesn't depend on whether debts are measured gross or net of current
liabilities. The second alternative has no implication for R ,BT, since
this variable is measured before taxes. This means that by comparing the
value for REAT computed previously with the value in the first alternative
measure, the effect on REAT of changing to a data set of higher quality is
isolated. The impact of the change on RTBT is thus found by comparing the
original measures with the second alternative measure.
Table 5 can be interpreted as follows: the use of data or higher qual-
ity will cause the picture of a declining RTBT to become even more out-
spoken (cf. Columns a) and c)). As should be expected, this is then also
the case for REAT - and to a greater extent (cf. columns d) and e)). The
detailed reasons behind this have previously been discussed in (4)25 and
will not be outlined here.
Further, a change of definition of capital has little effect on RTBT
other than that the level of rate of return of course becomes higher when
we change to a capital concept corresponding to smaller amounts (cf. columns
a) and b)). And if the definition of RE,AT is changed with respect to the
treatment of deferred taxes (treated as liabilities instead of owners'
equity), the RE,AT will look more gloomy (cf. columns d) and f)).
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As to the combined effect on the equity-ratio of the use of data of
higher quality and of changes in definition, Table 5 gives clear indications:
the decrease in the equity-ratio becomes more accentuated.
The general conclusion thus becomes: the use of data of higher quality
does not contradict the conclusions previously drawn on falling trends in
rates of return. On the contrary.
Behind the general pattern, substantial differences can occasionally
be found between different measures for specific years. Let us only pin-
point one difference, namely regarding REAT in 1973 and 1974. Recall the
spectacular outcome of REAT in 1974 according to Figure 5. When data of
higher quality are used, the outcome for 1974 is not as spectacular any
more - although still high - and it is not higher than 1973. If the defini-
tion is changed so as to include deferred taxes among the liabilities, the
outcome for 1974 even becomes lower than 1973. The implication of this is
that great caution should be exercized when basing decisions on relatively
poor aggregate data. For futher discussion on this topic, see (9).
Our final test of validity concerns a comparison between measures for
the aggregate and measures for individual firms. This is done in Table 6
where the aggregate numbers based on the best available data ("the KKR-
bank") are compared with the value for the median firm based on the same
data. To indicate the dispersion within the aggregate 25- and 75-percent-
iles are also given. The variables selected are RTBT and REAT defined
in the way used in Section IV.2. (The aggregate figures thus correspond
with the figures given in Table 5, columns c) and e), respectively.)
As can be seen in Table 6, analyzing the median firm instead of the
aggregate gives a slightly changed picture. The average values are lower
and the slope of the trendlines are more negative (decreasing). This indi-
Table 6
Comparison Between Measures for the Aggregate and for Individual Firms. Percent.
Year Aggregate
1966
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
3.6
.1 I
4.2
5.0
.1
1.4
2.6
4.6
4.0
.4
-. 8
Average 2.7
Slope (in
percentage
points
per year) - .17
Real RTBT
Median 25-percentile
3.1
4.2
3.5
3.7
-. 4
.8
2.7
4.0
2.3
-. 4
.0
1.9
- .31
-. 2
1.3
-. 4
.3
-4.2
-2.0
-. 6
.2
-2.1
-4.6
-5.3
-1.6
- .46
75-percentile
8.1
8.0
8.5
7.6
3.0
4.1
6.2
8.2
7.8
3.5
3.8
6.3
Aggregate
3.3
2.9
1.9
4.3
-. 6
.4
3.0
9.0
9.0
1.5
-. 9
3.1
Real RE,AT
Median 25-percentile
2.1
2.6
.7
2.3
-1.4
.9
3.3
8.1
6.8
.0
.6
2.2
- .34 .07 - .24
-3.5
-2.7
-6.6
-4.5
-9.1
-8.4
-3.6
1.2
-1.5
-8.8
-10.3
-5.3
75-percentile
9.9
10.1
9.3
9.4
5.4
5.7
10.1
16.5
17.7
6.6
8.3
9.9
- .39 .20
J,---
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cates that bigger (in terms of capital employed) companies have fared better
than smaller ones. An analysis of ROC indicates that this is not due to
bigger real holding gains but rather has to do with differences in relative
operating profitability.26
The data thus suggests that looking at individual firms does not
change the general conclusion of falling trends in profitability. On the
contrary, it shows bigger declines. By looking at the dispersion around
the medians, some indication as to the changes in financial risks accompany-
ing the decreased-ratio can be found.27 The pattern is: approximately even
dispersion (measured as the difference between the 25- and 75-percentiles)
around the median with respect to RTBT and increasing dispersion with res-
pect to RE AT. In the latter case, the increase has been followed by a de-
creased rather than an increased median value. This picture gives arguments
for the hypothesis that the period studied has seen increasing financial
risks following the decrease in equity-ratios and that the increase in fin-
ancial risk has not been followed by reducing operating risks (the risk with
respect to RT), thus indicating increased business risks (the risk with res-
pect to REAT). This conclusion is not contradicted by a common sense ana-
lysis of increased price turbulance, shorter lives on assets, increased rate
of inflation, etc., that characterize the 1970's as compared to previous de-
cades.
This is not the place to go into further detailed analysis of company
data. Let us instead finish the discussion with the general remark that
the differences between the aggregate and the median firm as well as the
wide distribution around the median value should foster great caution when
basing analyses on aggregate data: this is true for all kinds of measures
of profitability and refers to descriptions of long-term trends as well as
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analysis of changes from year to year and absolute levels for individual
years.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The figure and the discussion is based on the assumption that total
capital is defined excluding non-interest-bearing liabilities. By
"debt" is thus meant interest-bearing liabilities and by "non-monetary
assets" monetary assets less non-interest-bearing liabilities. The
reason for this "net approach" is its convenience in economic analy-
sis.
2. The difference between depreciation (or costs of goods sold) measured
at historical costs and measured at current costs equals realized
holding gains/losses.
3. The degree of approximation depends on many factors, including lives
of assets, growth rate, the manner in which specific prices increase
over time and asset structure. Great caution should be exercized when
using historical costs as a basis for descriptions over time. See also
note 14.
4. If the income concepts in Figure 1 are to be expressed in real terms
the holding gains/losses on nonmonetary assets must be expressed net
of inflation (i.e., as a function of relative changes in prices).
Further, financial income should be expressed net of losses due to
holding monetary asset during times of inflation. In the same way
interest expenses should be expressed net of "inflation gains" on
debts. This leaves a real income after tax that equals the nominal
income after tax - based on current costs - less "inflation loss" on
the owner's equity. Cf. (8) and (10).
5. The reason for the treatment of taxes in the manner indicated is mainly
due to pedagogical reasons. The Swedish corporate tax system is com-
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paratively "liberal" in that it gives the firm many different opportun-
ities to postpone tax payments. Writing down on inventories, acceler-
ated depreciation techniques, different kinds of investment funds are
the main examples. It has been shown very difficult to describe the
special features of the Swedish tax system to an interntional forum
not specifically interested in the taxation of firms. "Economic"
arguments for concentrating on actually paid taxes can easily be raised
but the perhaps most crucial argument in this report is that of avoid-
ing a difficulty that is mainly Swedish.
6. We will concentrate on companies on the socalled "A-list" at the
Stockholm Exchange.
7. The values for the period 1945-1964 are collected from (11) and con-
cern groups listed at the Stockholm Exchange all years 1946-64 (80
companies). The data for subsequent periods are collected from (14)
and concern companies listed all years during the periods, respective-
ly. The number of companies covered the final period, 1974-78, is 81.
8. We define the aggregate market value of debts at the beginning of period
t, M(Lt), as:
M(L ) = E(I)/it, where
E(I)t = Expected interest earned
it = Nominal market rate of interest
The simple formulation implies an infinite rather than finite income
stream. The fact that loans are repaid is thus - for the aggregate -
viewed as a tool for changing nominal rates over time rather than as
reflecting an intention that the lending is to be abandoned.
The formulation further implies that the expected interest earned
is constant over time. The expectation concerns interests earned on
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loans given at a specific point in time, t, but is nevertheless not
a true description of actual expectations. However, fluctuations in
interests earned over time are a function of fluctuations in the mar-
ket interest rate. At a specific point in time, the interest rate is
it and the expectations derived from that interest are given and
assumed constant, E(I)t'
As to the actual measurement of the components, it is perhaps
the most difficult one. Generally speaking, it is the (weighted)
average of the market rate on the "bank loan" market and the bond mar-
ket. These rates change over time and differ between companies and
between loans to the same company (due to the risk involved). What
we can observed are rates required by the market for the loans actually
given. Due to different kinds of regulations, the differences in risks
are, however, mainly accounted for by other means than by differences
in interest rates - leaving very small differences in interest rates
between companies and between markets. We will therefore use the mar-
ket interest rate on long-term industrial bonds as the base for our
measure of average market rate on all debt. To account for the higher
interest rate normally required on other types of loans, we have added
two percentage points to the bond rate.
The expected interest earned consists of two main parts. The
first regards loans where the face interest rate is given and constant
over time. Examples are bonds and some bank loans. Expected interest
earned on these loans can be computed by the market with a very high
degree of accuracy. The second part regards loans where the face inter-
est rate changes over time. These fluctuations reflect changes in the
market interest rate. At the beginning of period t, this market inter-
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est rate is it and the expected interest earned during period t becomes
a function of i . Since it only takes one value for the aggregate also
the second part of the expected interest earned can be computed with a
high degree of accuracy.
There is one problem, however. We don't know the relative weight
of the two components. The solution we have selected is therefore to
define E(I)t as the actual interest earned during the period, It. As
the first part in E(I)t, it is also included in It. The difference be-
tween E(I)t and It becomes a matter concerning the second part and thus
a function of changes in the market interest rate within period t. In
addition, there is a variance due to interest on new net borrowing.
Both variances are presumably small compared to It and should not inter-
fere too much with the validity of long-term descriptions.
Finally, in order to simplify the computations, let's assume that
all retirements, At, and issuance of new debts, Nt, is being made at
the end of the period, implying that the recorded interest expenses
should be interpreted as the interest expense for the liabilities,
Lt, at hand at the beginning of the period. Then, the market rate of
return on debt, R(L)t, can be expressed as:
R(L)t = (M(L t) - M(L t-1) - (Nt - At ) + I t)/M(L t-1).
9. FINDATA is managed by the Economic Research Institute at the Stockholm
School of Economics.
10. These figures differ slightly from the figures in Table 1 for three
reasons: First, the averages in Table 2 are computed from yearly rates
of return. Secondly, Table 2 regards the aggregate (weighted average)
while Table 1 regards the unweighted average. Finally, Table 3 con-
cerns business groups listed on the Stockholm Exchange during all years
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1966-78 (45 companies) while Table 1 includes companies listed for
shorter periods. Cf. footnote 7.
11. The interest bearing debts are not separated in FINDATA since annual
reports seldom make the distinction between interest bearing and non-
interest bearing debts. The figures have been computed by applying
the ratio of interest bearing debts to all debts (excluding deferred
taxes) for each year for Swedish corporations (as described in another
data set, "KKR-bank"; cf. Section IV.3).
12. This means that RTAT is defined as "income to be shared" (see Figure
1) less taxes paid or accrued (but exclusive of deferred taxes). With
RTBT (i.e., before taxes) given and by definition independent of the
equity-ratio this makes RTAT become a function of the equity-ratio.
The lower the ratio - ceteris paribus - the higher the interest ex-
penses and the lower the taxes (since interest expenses are deductible
when computing taxes) and thus the higher is the sum of interest ex-
pense and income after taxes. This is consistent with those lines in
financial theory that hold that the value of the firm is dependent on
the capital structure via the tax impact. Cf. for example (5) and (7).
The alternative to this approach - thus making the return after tax
independent of the equity-ratio - would be to add an "interest after
company taxes" - concept to income after taxes when computing the num-
erator. This is frequently done but means a severe suffering of common-
sense interpretation of the income concept.
13. Compared to a correctly measured real rate of return - i.e., based on
current costs - change in unrealized holding gains/losses (measured in
real terms) is missing in the numerator and accumulated unrealized
holding losses/gains are missing in the denominator.
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14. In a study of the approximately 400 largest Swedish corporations for
the period 1966-76 (cf. Part IV.3), the aggregate values for real rates
return on owners' equity, based on current costs, was mostly under-
stated by parts of a percentage point during the early part of the
period (1966-71) when historical costs were used. When the rate of
inflation increased during the latter part of the period (1972-76),
the understatement increased to an average of slightly above one per-
centage point. The understatement was especially high - as one should
expect - when the inflation rate increased, but was reduced when the
inflation rate was stabilized - even if it was at a higher level.
The understatement of real return on total capital was slightly
smaller.
It should be noted that the mentioned variances concern rates of
return defined slightly different than what is used in the present con-
text.
15. Measured as a percentage of book value, the market value of debts de-
creased from 97.2 percent in 1966 to 83.9 percent in 1978.
16. The market value of stocks was 49.7 percent of the book value of
owners' equity - as measured in Table 3 (i.e., including deferred
taxes) - in 1966 and decreased in 39.2 percent in 1978.
17. The relation between market value and historical cost of total equity
was .61 in both 1966 and 1978. The relation between historical cost
and replacement cost should, however, be falling during the period
due to increasing rate of specific price increases. This would mean
a falling g.
18. Some legal units might have operations abroad that are not run in the
form of subsidiaries and that consequently will be included in the
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corporations studied but that should be excluded if domestic operations
were to be operationlized literally.
19. The data in Part IV.2 has most kindly been made available by Jan
Soldersten at the University of Uppsala.
20. To pinpoint the turning point is partly a matter of taste: should
it be set before or after the peak of the business cycle (1959), i.e.
should i be set at 1958 or 1960. We have chosen the latter alternative.
21. In Figures 3 and 4, no descriptions for the years 1951-53 are made.
This is due to lack of data.
22. Land is excluded becuase measures are not available in the data set
used. Cf. (1). Monetary assets are measured gross, i.e., non-inter-
est-bearing liabilities (or, alternatively, short-term liabilities)
have not been deducted from the monetary assets. This makes the capi-
tal measure higher, ceteris paribus, than the one used in Psrt III. 3.
See also Part IV.3.
23. When interpreting the difference between RT and ROC it should be held
in mind that the capital concept used in RT includes the gross monetary
assets. Cf. note 22.
24. Following the price turbulance and increase in the rate of inflation
that accompanied the "oil shock" in 1973 came very high nominal account-
ing profits reported by companies in 1974. In order to prevent tem-
porary windfall gains to be taxed, special rules were enforced to
lighten the tax burden. This resulted in the lowest effective tax
rate (taxes payable as a percentage of operating income) ever exper-
ienced during the previous or following parts of the period under study.
25. In (4), the focus for comparisons was the kind of data used in Section
IV.2 of this report on the one hand, and the kind of data used in Sec-
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tion IV.3 on the other hand. The comparison was initiated by an art-
icle on rates of return, based on the first kind of data (1). The
numbers presented in that article do, however, differ from the numbers
presented in Section IV.2 of this report. The reason for this is that
in computing the numbers used in this report, separate indices for
building and machinery have been used whilst a weighted index was used
in (1).
25. The average ROC during 1966-76 for the aggregate was 3.8 percent and for
the median 2.6 percent. For ROC, including holding gains/losses it was
4.3 and 3.2 percent respectively.
26. One shouldn't uncritically confuse expected distribution of outcomes
for one firm - it is in this context risk concepts should be defined -
and the distribution of actual outcomes for many firms. The arguments
formulated, however, rest on the assumption that bigger dispersion of
outcomes between firms is a sign of bigger disperson of expected out-
comes for each individual firm.
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